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“No one wants the taint of an association with the crimes of Nazism”1:  
(Sometimes) In Search of the Meaning of Nazi Law  
Nazi Law: From Nuremberg to Nuremberg, edited by John J. Michalczyk, London, 
Bloomsbury, 2018, xviii + 343pp, (hardback), ISBN 978-1-350-00723-9 
Law and the Holocaust: U.S. Cases and Materials, by Michael J. Bazyler and Robert 
M. Jarvis, Durham NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2018, xxi + 789pp, (ebook), ISBN 
978-1-53100-832-1 
The Remnants of the Rechtsstaat: An Ethnography of Nazi Law, by Jens 
Meierhenrich, Oxford, OUP, 2018, viii + 437pp, (hardback), ISBN 978-0-19-881411-2 
Hitler's American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, by 
James Q Whitman, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2017, 208pp 
(hardback), ISBN 978-0-691-17242-2 
Introduction: Towards a Unified Discourse of Nazi Law 
In 2011 David Fraser highlighted ‘the lacunae … in legal scholarship’s treatment of 
the Nazi killing machine as a juridical phenomenon’.2 This same void in the legal 
academy’s engagement with the Third Reich, especially the Holocaust, has been 
commented on elsewhere3 and may be extended to include a paucity of scholarship 
about Nazi law within historiography. These gaps have become increasingly well 
recognized in recent years in works that do engage with Nazi law. Alan Steinweis 
and Robert Rachlin opened the introduction to their 2013 edited collection The Law 
in Nazi Germany with the words “[t]he legal history of Nazi Germany has not 
attracted a great deal of attention from scholars.”4 We can relate the relative lack of 
attention paid by the legal academy to the Third Reich, and by the historical 
academy to Nazi law, to the “rupture thesis,”5 the idea that Nazi Germany represents 
a rupture from normal legal and historical development.  
While this narrative has been largely (though not entirely) superseded in the general 
historiography of the Third Reich, it has remained stubbornly durable in legal history 
and theory.6 More than 15 years ago, historian Patricia Szobar highlighted how “the 
law under National Socialism is typically regarded as having constituted a complete 
break from modern legal norms and standards.”7 In short if Nazi law is an aberration 
from the normal concept of law, then it does not merit theoretical or empirical study 
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as law. Nazi Germany is variously a lawless state, a criminal state, a non-state. This 
has been exacerbated by a predominant approach to Nazi law informed by key 
models of Nazi Germany that emphasized its lawlessness, such as Franz 
Neumann’s famous study. As Meierhenrich notes, “one of the most troublesome 
legacies of Behemoth’s enormous success has been its contribution to the 
marginalization of law in the study of the Third Reich” (53). 
We are now, however, witnessing a notable upsurge in English language academic 
writing about Nazi law, represented by the books discussed here. Whitman 
elucidates the influence of United States race laws on the 1935 Nuremberg Laws. 
Meierhenrich explores Ernst Fraenkel’s dual state theory of the Nazi legal system. 
Michalzcyk’s collection provides accounts of the use of law in different areas of the 
Third Reich. Bazyler and Jarvis’s book is slightly different, offering a set of teaching 
materials—a casebook for use in US law schools—which mines predominantly US 
case judgments for the story and legal implications of the Holocaust. Furthermore, 
since 2013, book-length studies covering Nazi law have been published by Steinweis 
and Rachlin, Herlinde Pauer-Studer and J David Vellemann,8 Thomas Vormbaum,9 
and Michael Stolleis10. There is more attention to Nazi law, but the extent to which 
these works address concerns about the legal academy’s neglect for the Third 
Reich, the historical academy’s disregard for Nazi law, and the prevalence of the 
rupture thesis, is open to question.  
We may also both marvel and despair at the wide ranging disciplinary approaches 
and research specialisms of those writing about Nazi law. They include political 
scientists, legal scholars with a variety of specialisms, legal practitioners, legal 
historians, general historians, and academics from other disciplines including 
philosophy, psychology, ethics and medicine. The varying subjects and approaches 
of the texts are indicative to a degree of both the wide range of multi-disciplinary 
writing about the Third Reich generally, and the expansive but atomized nature of 
research interest in Nazism within the historical academy. What is particularly 
apparent from some of the studies of Nazi law is how little cross-pollination there is 
between methods, approaches and interpretations of legal theorists, legal historians 
and other historians. In the works surveyed here, Whitman’s is a work of 
comparative legal history; Meierhenrich’s is a work of legal theory and intellectual 
history; Michalczyk’s is an interdisciplinary collection primarily comprising sub-fields 
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of general history and legal history; Bazyler and Jarvis, meanwhile, present a case 
and materials book primarily of American law. 
The isolation of different disciplines in studying Nazi law is illustrated by an example 
drawn from Meierhenrich’s fascinating book about Ernst Fraenkel’s “dual state” 
concept of Nazi law. It is surprising for someone initially schooled in the history of 
Nazi Germany to see Meierhenrich refer to Fraenkel’s “forgotten theory” of the dual 
state (13), but this is not something Meierhenrich mentions only in passing. He goes 
on to describe Fraenkel’s model as “rarely invoked nowadays,” “largely forgotten 
these days” (13) and “virtually unknown” (23). Historical studies of the Third Reich 
belie this description of the currency of the dual state, however. Steinweis and 
Rachlin say it “remains highly influential in our understanding of Nazi legal practice 
today.”11 Steber and Gotto assert that Fraenkel “famously saw rule in Nazi Germany 
as a duality.”12 Michael Stolleis makes reference to it in various works. Nikolaus 
Wachsmann devotes five pages to discussion of the dual state in his study of Hitler’s 
prisons, asserting that “Fraenkel’s work is one of the most cited works on the 
structure of the Third Reich, a key text used to investigate the nature of Nazi 
dictatorship.”13 Meierhenrich at the same time describes Carl Schmitt’s body of work 
as having “been studied ad nauseam” (23) whereas, while historical studies of Nazi 
Germany might make passing reference to the biography of Schmitt as a prominent 
constitutional theorist under the Nazis, they rarely engage in detail with his theories 
about Nazi law. 
The difference here is evidence of the largely distinct disciplinary fields of study 
relating to Nazi law. Historians of the Third Reich, on the whole, remain very much 
influenced by Fraenkel’s work, but have very little to say about Carl Schmitt’s legal 
and political theory, whereas Schmitt is much more influential and studied among 
legal and political theorists. In some ways Fraenkel’s study of the Third Reich is 
today viewed as a specific analysis rather than a generally applicable model, which 
has connections to the rupture thesis and its underpinning idea of the Third Reich as 
a unique aberration, according to which Nazi Germany cannot really be compared 
even to other authoritarian of fascist regimes. From this perspective, Fraenkel’s 
theory is unique to the Nazi state. As Whitman points out in his compact but 
excellent exploration of the influence of US racist law and practice on the Nuremberg 
Laws, “we are accustomed to thinking of Nazism as an ultimately unparalleled 
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horror” (3). Notwithstanding his comments about Fraenkel’s influence in the 
academy, Meierhenrich does make good use of a range of theoretical and empirical 
scholarship, including general and legal histories of Nazi Germany, throughout his 
book, but evidence of largely discrete pockets of study of Nazi law is not difficult to 
find in the scholarship. 
Addressing the neglect of the dual state model to make Fraenkel’s theory 
serviceable as a general model of authoritarian law for political theory is one of the 
key objectives of Meierhenrich’s book. It is also one of its most valuable 
contributions, both for theorists of authoritarian law, but also for historians because 
of the process the author works through to achieve this. This is because, despite the 
dual state’s continuing popularity among historians of the Nazi state, the 
historiographical application of this model is open to question. Wachsmann, for 
example, argues that it “has often been simplified, misunderstood and shorn of its 
more radical conclusions.”14 Rather than being ignored, then, in historiography of the 
Nazi state and legal system at least, simplified forms of Fraenkel’s thesis have been 
over-influential. By taking the time to unpack and reapply the model to the Third 
Reich, Meierhenrich reasserts a more nuanced and accurate version of the dual 
state for use in subsequent studies of Nazi state and law, while also attempting to 
advance an expanded and adapted version applicable to the authoritarian rule of 
law.  
Furthermore, while Fraenkel has remained influential, there is little doubt that 
Neumann’s Behemoth thesis has had a more powerful impact in the historical 
academy and beyond, particularly on our conceptualisation of Nazi law, and this “has 
done a fair amount to obscure—rather than illuminate—the logic of Nazi dictatorship” 
(22). This can be seen in his influence on the Nuremberg Trials,15 post-war legal 
philosophy (37), and in subsequent scholarship where “[r]eductionist perspectives 
like Neumann’s continue to hold sway today” (27). Meierhenrich is arguably harsh on 
Neumann’s study, but others more open to the merits of Behemoth have also 
recognized that Neumann’s approach in terms of the law ultimately “serves to 
disqualify much of what Neumann has to say about Nazi law as potentially useful to 
any current or future research project at a foundational level.”16 Consequently, 
Meierhenrich’s explicit rejection of Neumann’s theory and his elevation in its place of 
a model that frame Nazi law as law, helps to continue to challenge the long dominant 
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characterisation of the Third Reich as lawless, one of the implications of which has 
been a general neglect of Nazi law in Anglo-American jurisprudence and 
historiography. It is therefore significant that it is central to his thesis that the “idea of 
‘Nazi law’ … is not an oxymoron but was a fact of everyday life—a claim at odds with 
a prominent supposition in legal philosophy” (3).  
(Not) In Search of the Meaning of Nazi Law 
When writing about Nazi law, phrases often used include that the regime “clothed 
itself with a tinsel of legal form,”17 that Nazi law only instrumentalized or weaponized 
the law, that it undermined, abused, manipulated, debased or perverted the rule or 
law, that it was a pretence or faҫade of legality, that the “dagger of the assassin was 
concealed beneath the robe of the jurist,”18 or simply that the Nazi state was in whole 
or in part “lawless.” This line of interpretation is largely challenged by Meierhenrich, 
who provides a much more nuanced account of Nazi law than one of pure 
instrumentalism. Variations of this language are, nevertheless, commonplace in the 
historiography of Nazi law and it is true to say that the Nazis dismantled legal 
protections, manipulated the law, and used violence as part of the justice system, to 
a point. It is the imposition of this as the dominant or sole interpretation of the nature 
of Nazi law that is problematic. Szobar has recognized that: 
even in Nazi Germany, the law had a constitutive function as well as a 
coercive and instrumental one. Law was not simply a thing apart ... Rather, 
law under National Socialism was also a set of institutions, practices, and 
actors that participated and interacted with what Friedman has termed the 
‘battery of normative ideas and habits’ of everyday life.19 
The idea that Nazi law was not simply a system of terror used to repress, persecute 
and punish but was also important in shaping the norms of everyday life resonates 
well with a body of historiography that now pays great attention to both the role of 
consent in the Third Reich and the relevance of ideology—often reflected in the use 
of the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft—to the construction and maintenance of 
consent. Nazi law, too, can be effectively analysed as a system that constituted 
societal norms as well as one that enforced them through terror, but this is not a 
standard approach, and so far this important perspective has been largely ignored. 
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Michalczyk’s edited collection of essays is largely drawn from contributors to a 2015 
conference “Legally Blind: Law, Ethics and the Third Reich.” The book comprises 18 
chapters divided into five parts. Part 1 focuses on the Jews in the justice system; 
Part 2 considers medicine and eugenics; Part 3 has two chapters on the economic 
exploitation of the Jews; Part 4 covers religion; and Part 5 looks at aspects of the 
war crimes trials. Each part is prefaced with a short, descriptive introduction setting 
the context for those chapters. An editor’s introduction provides some background 
and chapter summaries rather than explicit thematic coherence, and a brief editorial 
epilogue highlights some contemporary shadows and echoes from the Nazi period. It 
is a fairly uneven book in terms of coverage, method and subject-matter: some 
chapters have helpful bibliographies, others don’t; and some are more extensively 
sourced than others.  
The dominant discourse of the way Nazi law is used in the book is already apparent 
from the back cover summary referring to way the Nazis “used the law as a weapon” 
and “manipulated the legal system and the constitution.” The introduction asserts the 
Nazis “simply engineered the legal system for their own ends” (8), “manipulating the 
legal system to wreak havoc on the German community” (1). Similar references 
appear in various chapters of the book. For example, in his own chapter about the 
People’s Court Michalczyk says the Nazification process “destroyed any semblance 
of law” (88). In her chapter on the persecution of homosexuals, Murphy refers to 
points where “the regime shores up its dictatorial nature by undermining positive law” 
(115). In a chapter about the Nazi acquisition of art and other cultural objects 
Amineddoleh associates relevant Nazi laws with the assertion “[a]s with most Nazi 
actions, Hitler’s thugs hid behind Third Reich laws” (172). In his chapter about the 
persecution of German Protestants Probst notes that relevant laws “were merely 
instruments that the leaders of the Nazi regime utilized” (201). 
The focus of the research is, therefore, mainly on the use of law by the Nazis as an 
instrument of terror, for example in the persecution of Jews and religious and sexual 
minorities and the operation of the People’s Court. This is not to say the book is 
unimportant, but rather that it does not provide a complete picture of Nazi law. 
Firstly, more research specifically concentrated on Nazi law is very welcome, and 
encourages greater academic dialogue about the nature and use of law in the Third 
Reich. Secondly, the Nazis did use law extensively to persecute minority and 
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opposition groups, and these histories should continue to be written. In addition to 
this, while many of the chapters are shorter than is ideal for achieving the depth of 
evaluation desired by a researcher, they often introduce their subjects well for 
students and summarize or reflect important recent trends in research. This includes 
a greater focus on the persecution of minority groups such as homosexuals (Chapter 
8) and Jehovah’s Witnesses (Chapter 15), or on forms of resistance such as in the 
Protestant Church (Chapter 14), or highlighting current legal and ethical issues 
linked to the Nazi past in respect of restitution of property (Chapter 12), torture 
(Chapter 9) or medicine (chapters 10 and 18).  
Individual chapters also provide interesting insights. Morris’ overview of natural law 
theory in Germany from 1900-1950 in Chapter 1 picks up on key points including the 
Nazi’s rejection of legal positivism and embrace of a version of natural law theory 
(18-19). Romeiser’s discussion of the application in Vichy France of legislation in 
parallel to the Nuremberg Laws in Chapter 4 is also valuable for exposing the extent 
to which antisemitic law in Vichy was home grown, sometimes harsher than the 
German equivalents, and did not protect native French Jews over recently 
naturalized Jews, contrary to popular perception. Golan’s discussion of Claude 
Lanzmann’s 2013 film Last of the Unjust (Chapter 5) is a thought-provoking 
combination of film criticism and evaluation of the guilt of its protagonist, the head of 
the Terezin Judenrat, Benjamin Murmelstein. The author considers the Judenrat’s 
responsibility and the collaborator status of victims, as well as the individual’s 
responsibility to the community generally, through four theoretical frameworks. In 
these chapters, however, like others, the analysis is generally brief, with the reader 
craving more detail, insight and evaluation of the implications of the findings; there is 
an emphasis on narrative accounts and a sometimes sparse application of 
theoretical concepts.  
Golan’s chapter also illustrates the book’s very broad definition of “Nazi law,” which 
incorporates not only laws used to prosecute Nazis (Part 5), but also in that case the 
framing of Lanzmann’s film as a trial of Murmelstein. Other chapters say very little 
about Nazi law or only have a tenuous connection to it. This highlights the book’s 
equivocal approach to what Nazi law is and how it should be understood as a 
system, beyond a series of discrete persecutory measures. As is typical in the 
historiography, therefore, while individual Nazi laws are generally described as law 
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and treated as a form of positive law, references to the destruction of law, the 
undermining of law, and lawlessness abound without much reflection on the 
systemic nature of the Nazi legal regime. This often extends to the specifically legal 
terminology and taxonomy used. “Theft,” for example, is particularly used in the two 
chapters in Part 3 about the Nazi removal of property owned by the Jews, where it is 
accompanied by related terms such as “plunder” and “looting.” Chapter 11 discusses 
the confiscation of Jewish property in the occupied General Government and 
Chapter 12 covers the seizure and destruction of art and cultural heritage using the 
law and the legal tools subsequently used to address this. In these, various different 
kinds of law-related scenarios are described using similar labels, whereas, with 
some exceptions, is not often clear on which occasions the Nazis were actually 
enforcing the law and when they were acting purely violently and outside of the legal 
framework they had constructed. 
There are many possible justifications for the use of these examples of legal 
terminology, which criminalize state actions often supported by Nazi laws, but there 
is a danger that the ambiguous and unexplained use of legal terms with specific 
meanings does more to cloud than clarify the relevant legal history. On some levels, 
arguably, this is not so consequential, but if, for example, we are to follow 
Meierhenrich in re-applying the dual state model to Nazi law using his socio-
legal/anthropological methodology (rather than an abstract, philosophical approach), 
accurate analysis could be very useful for understanding the operation of the 
normative and prerogative states. Furthermore, bigger theoretical questions about 
the complicity of law in the Holocaust and the rupture thesis are raised because, if all 
acts of Nazi confiscation are theft, then they are by definition unlawful and 
manifestations of lawlessness. It is consequently essential in this context to 
understand why they are given this label, and this is not made clear in the book. 
This point relates to the lack of discussion about the systemic nature of Nazi law as a 
whole in a book ostensibly about Nazi law. The body of empirical-historical evidence 
about Nazi laws is not generally put in the service of a sustained, coherent picture of 
Nazi law, or at least not one that goes beyond mere instrumentalism. As with most of 
the scholarship, the areas of law focused on are generally those where the model of 
persecution and terror is most apparent, but this does not tell the whole legal story. 
Those who have attempted to examine, understand and theorize Nazi law in the past 
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or more recently (from whatever perspective) are either entirely excluded (Fuller, 
Fraser), or are included only in isolated sections (Schmitt, Neumann, Fraenkel, 
Radbruch), which again points to the isolation of different pockets of Nazi law 
research. Chapter 1 touches on the relationship of Neumann, Fraenkel and 
Radbruch to natural law theory and briefly compares the use of exceptionalism by 
Radbruch and Schmitt, but it does not engage in any detail in what these thinkers 
said about the nature of Nazi law. Chapter 2, by Bookbinder, does consider the 
development of Schmitt’s thought, but is more personal to Schmitt and so is quite 
brief on what he meant for the Nazi legal vision more generally. His conclusion about 
Schmitt’s influence on Nazi law is that it “helped the Nazis to create a lawless state 
with categories of people who had no rights” (34), which requires further unpacking. 
There is also a lack of reckoning with the complicity of law in the Third Reich, which 
stands out particularly strongly because of the way certain chapters promote a 
reckoning with the complicity of medicine. Dan Stone convincingly argues that “in 
order to think through Nazism, we must recognize an inevitable complicity with it,”20 
and overcoming the rupture thesis in respect of Nazi law is largely about recognizing 
and working through continuity and complicity with the Third Reich. In Chapter 18 on 
the reception of the Nuremberg Code in the US, Johnson challenges a previously 
dominant narrative about the difference between Nazi medicine and US medicine (or 
“civilized” medicine), and shows how it was not that it was Nazi medicine that caused 
the medical horrors of the regime, but medicine itself could be complicit with Nazism 
because of “the accepted social and legal norms of the time” (254). While Johnson’s 
chapter highlights some of the connections between Nazi law and medicine, this 
journey is not explicitly revealed for law and legal professionals. Fernandes (Chapter 
10) focuses on bioethics, arguing that the Holocaust involves “the corruption of moral 
philosophy first, and medicine and law second” (139), and also makes connections 
between law and medicine. Again, however, the main focus is on medicine, and so 
the implications that arise for law in being equally susceptible to changes in moral 
philosophy are not fully explored. 
The most likely chapter to advance this for the law is Chapter 9, in which Annas and 
Crosby explore the involvement of lawyers and physicians in torture under the Bush 
government in the war on terror. What is missing here is not law per se but the Nazi 
legal history, as the historical discussion is not about the Third Reich but the lineage 
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of the law against torture from the Nuremberg trials onwards, and the apparent 
ignorance of the Bush administration’s lawyers to those developments. So while 
there is some very interesting material on doctors and lawyers overcoming their 
professional, ethical inhibitions to collaborate in torture and the idea of being 
socialized to atrocity, what is missing is a discussion of the antecedent connection 
between Nazi law and the Nuremberg trials that highlights the legal continuities 
between the past and the present.21 
As well as emphasizing instrumentalization and concentrating on the areas where 
law was used for persecution, terror and repression, Nazi Law also tends to return to 
the aspects of the relationship between law and the Holocaust typically addressed in 
the scholarship. These include law in the post-war period, dealing with the fallout 
from the regime, which incorporates war crimes trials in particular, but also ongoing 
property restitution cases. Complicity, to the extent it is discussed in the legal 
sphere, is often about the continuing professional life of legal officials in post-war 
Germany, in spite of their Nazi pasts. The attention to war crimes trials, for example, 
is evident in a spate of works specifically about different examples that have 
appeared since the turn of the millennium.22 This subject matter is clearly important, 
especially to the extent that the scholarship both calls attention to other trials beyond 
the famous Nuremberg IMT and reveals how the various trials have impacted on the 
historical and legal memory of the Third Reich. It is nonetheless peculiar how much 
of “law and the Holocaust” scholarship is not devoted to Nazi law. 
Law and the Holocaust is the impressive output of an evidently herculean effort. 
While there are some previous examinations of US court cases relating to Nazi 
Germany, including Bazyler’s own 2000 article,23 it is not a particularly well 
developed field of study considering the vast amount of post-Holocaust litigation in 
American courts. So the achievement of selecting the cases and extracts, compiling 
them into a coherent whole, and adding editorial comments, all with a mind to 
appropriate pedagogy for supporting the teaching of a thematic law school course—
not to mention producing an extensive accompanying teaching manual of over 100 
pages—must be applauded. It would, however, be a course on law and the 
Holocaust that says relatively little about the law used to perpetrate the Shoah. 
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The stated aim of the book is to “aid students in becoming more sensitive and 
thoughtful lawyers” (xxi), and there is little doubt that this would be achieved because 
of the nature of the subject matter. It is also true that post-Holocaust litigation has 
raised doctrinal and professional ethical issues for American law, and many of these 
are well brought to light in the book. It opens with a long introductory section, in 
which a brief overview is followed by a section on Nazi history, which employs 
extracts from three case judgments (an IMT case, NMT case and an extradition case 
for an Auschwitz guard) innovatively to provide students with the necessary historical 
background and highlight key aspects of the Third Reich. This is supplemented by 
shorter extracts from other sources and editorial notes that fill in factual details, 
provide additional information and further reading, and sometimes highlight further 
legal and related issues, an editorial pattern adopted throughout the remainder of the 
book. 
The introduction is followed by three additional sections. Part II covers war crimes 
trials against the perpetrators; Part III covers cases about restitution for the victims; 
and Part IV, titled “Other vestiges,” incorporates a range of other Nazi-related 
litigation, including for example first amendment cases around people expressing 
religious or other views related to their direct or secondary experience with the 
Holocaust and Holocaust denial and hate speech. However, the implication of the 
general focus on law arising from the Holocaust and the lack of law contributing to 
the Holocaust is that law was what happened in response to the Nazi regime, but not 
under the Nazi regime itself, reinforcing the opposition of (non-)law before Auschwitz 
and law after Auschwitz24 that permeates the scholarship. 
The relative absence of reflection on Nazi law in the book is exemplified in Part I, 
where a short extract from Hilary Earl’s 2017 article about the Nuremberg SS-
Einsatzgruppen Trial25 (39-40) is used in advance of a section of the judgment itself 
to highlight the focus of the Einsatzgruppen trial on the Holocaust. The extract refers 
to the influential narrative of Nazi genocide that the case constructed,26 but the 
operation and documenting of the Holocaust in the trial is the focus for Bazyler and 
Jarvis, so while Earl’s book-length study of the Einsatzgruppen Trial is referenced in 
the editorial comments,27 the significant part of Earl’s article that interrogates and 
problematizes the legacy of the legal and historical understanding constructed by the 
trial is entirely overlooked in the treatment it receives. Earl’s conclusion that the 
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“legal and procedural norms that governed the Einsatzgruppen trial may have 
distorted our historical understanding of certain elements of the Final Solution”28 is 
by-passed.  
The subsequent introductory section, headed “Germany’s Judges” focuses more 
directly on the Nazi legal system, using an extract from the Nuremberg Justice case 
to explicate the workings of the judiciary. As with the previous example, the extract 
demonstrates the NMT court’s framing of Nazi law, but while concerns about the 
problematic legacy of the construction of Nazi law have been analysed elsewhere, 
they are not raised in the book.29 In fairness, this is not always the case, and when 
Nazi eugenics are discussed, the general and specifically legal role of eugenics in 
the US is highlighted, including a further reading reference to Whitman’s book (93). 
There is also, for example, an interesting discussion about the role of professional 
lawyers in Nazi Germany associated with cases about Holocaust classroom 
exercises in schools (531-534), which highlights some of complexities inherent in 
acting as a lawyer in a regime of unjust laws, as well as the ease with which a group 
can become normalized into an authoritarian mind set.  
On the whole, however, the focus of the book is on technical questions for American 
law raised by post-Holocaust cases before US courts, and ethical issues, when they 
are raised, are generally narrower, professional issues associated with practising the 
law in the US. The editorial comments that encase the various extracts are 
surprisingly brief (perhaps necessitated by the overall length of the book) and 
descriptive. While applauding the desire to let the extracts speak for themselves as 
much as possible, perhaps the overall balance of the book is too much towards long 
extracts and away from editorial commentary. This is somewhat mitigated by the 
inclusion of the accompanying teaching materials, which include sample course 
materials and exam questions and sometimes suggest particular points to pick up on 
with the students, but again the focus is on similar issues. This is not, of itself, a 
criticism of the editorial choices made, because it reflects the focus of the book as a 
resource for US law students; as such it is a huge accomplishment and would form 
the basis of an excellent course. What is largely absent, however, which would be 
beneficial for legal training, is broader moral and jurisprudential reflection on the 
nature of law in the Third Reich, how it relates to other legal regimes, and the role of 
legal cases in constructing problematic narratives about both law and history.  
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Theorizing the Nazi Legal System 
In terms of addressing legal continuities across time and space, the complicity of law 
in the Third Reich, and reflecting on the systemic nature of Nazi law, Whitman’s 
comparative legal history has most in common with Meierhenrich’s book, and both 
works represent important developments in Nazi law scholarship. Something that 
unites them is an effort to challenge dominant narratives about Nazi law. In 
Meierhenrich’s case it is the representation of Nazi law as non-law, and the neglect 
of Fraenkel within legal and political theory that prevents his dual state theory from 
being applied more widely. In Whitman’s case, he is contesting a consensus view on 
the specific question of the influence of the US on Nazi race law, which is that Nazis 
only made reference to US race laws “in order to claim a specious parallel to their 
racist programs in the face of international condemnation” (4).  
Whitman’s is an explicitly comparative law project, which develops from his previous 
writings about law and the Third Reich emphasizing continuity and comparison.30 
The book is divided into two substantive chapters based on the structure of the 
Nuremberg Laws, bookended by an introduction and conclusion. The first chapter 
examines the Citizenship Law, and includes a section on the less discussed Flag 
Law. Chapter 2 looks at the Blood Protection Law. Whitman’s aim is to go beyond 
previous narrow comparative techniques that have been applied to this area, which 
have tended to deny a strong connection between US and Nazi discrimination law 
because of literal differences between the laws. For example, that US laws were 
aimed at African Americans and not Jews; and the US system was one of 
segregation using the Jim Crow laws whereas the Nazis did not create a similarly 
segregated society. In each case Whitman highlights the American example, gives a 
brief history of the German context of the law in question, and outlines the creation of 
that law more specifically, with reference to the US influence. 
Whitman’s view is that scholars have not previously written the history of the influence 
of US race laws on Nazi race laws because “they have been looking in the wrong place 
and have been employing the wrong interpretive tools” (11). He also sees an obstacle 
in another manifestation of the rupture thesis, the prevailing feeling that “the notion 
that Nazi policy makers may have been in some way inspired by American models 
may seem a bit too awful to contemplate. It may also seem implausible” (2). As a 
comparative lawyer, Whitman’s methodology is more subtle, studying the process of 
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translation from American to Nazi law, which for various reasons was not a case of 
direct borrowing: “[c]omparative law influence is not just a matter of lifting particular 
regulations, copying particular paragraphs, or transplanting particular institutions” (72). 
Through this method he establishes that the Nazis were less concerned about 
segregation and, as exemplified in the Nuremberg laws, more concerned about 
citizenship, sex and reproduction, because of their overriding aim to maintain the racial 
purity of the population. 
The specific conclusion Whitman reaches is that while they certainly did not like 
everything about the US system, “Nazi lawyers regarded America … as the 
innovative world leader in the creation of racist law.” Perhaps most importantly for 
Nazi law research and representation, Whitman is willing to draw out some of the 
wider implications of his findings, which help to refute the rupture thesis beyond the 
challenge to it presented by the act of comparison itself: 
The Nazis were not simply demons who erupted out of some dark underworld 
to shatter what was good and just within the Western tradition, until they were 
put down by the force of arms and the authentic humane and progressive 
values of Europe were restored. There were traditions of Western 
government within which they worked. There were continuities between 
Nazism and what came before and after. There were examples and 
inspirations on which the Nazism drew, and American race law was 
prominent among them (15). 
Whitman considers what his conclusions say about US legal culture and 
jurisprudence more broadly at the time, in terms of the attraction for the Nazis of “the 
allure of an open-ended, flexible, American common-law approach to the law,” of 
“American ‘realism’,” and of the “American willingness to innovate” in its legal system 
(146). This problematizes the dominant perception of the common law as a providing 
a liberal bastion and bulwark against overweening state power in contrast to civil law, 
“a system in which the law is reduced to the comparatively inflexible commands of a 
powerful state” (147). It also emphasizes the extent to which the Nazis desired to 
move away from the code-based civil law to achieve “a healthy law that ‘emerged out 
of the Volk’ rather than being the product of barren legal formalism” (146). The Nazi 
legal vision was, in some ways, much more like the common law than the civil law 
and so “if there are jurisprudential lessons to be learned from the crimes of Nazism 
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they are not lessons in any simple way about the dangers of crass legal positivism or 
of civil-law attitudes” (148). 
In terms of US law, Whitman highlights how the courts, while active in other areas, 
largely did not challenge racist legislation, reflecting the dominant political ideology at 
the time, and often improvized to apply the law, notwithstanding the “conceptual 
incoherence of their racist decisions” (152). Whitman also expands this across time, 
highlighting briefly the example of American criminal justice and laws to suggest that 
the characteristics of American legal culture he identified as attractive to the Nazis 
still pose problems today. This aspect of the thesis is less well developed and less 
satisfactory as a result, but it does begin to reveal aspects of continuity across time 
and the potential complicity of contemporary law with the Third Reich, which must be 
explored further if we are truly to come to terms with the Nazi legal past. 
As with any monograph, there are other limitations to it. It is quite a short book (at 
only 161 pages excluding notes) and more elaboration of some of the issues raised 
would be welcomed. This is not to detract from its tight focus on unpacking the US 
influence on the Nuremberg Laws, a significant task that Whitman achieves 
successfully. Beyond this, while Whitman engages with some general historiography 
of the Third Reich well, for example employing Ian Kershaw’s concept of “working 
towards the Führer” to highlight aspects of Nazi law (149), there is little engagement 
with the growing literature on Nazi law. This is less a criticism of the sources used, 
but more a comment on how the relative brevity of the text can be slightly 
unsatisfying in terms of digging deeper into some of the issues rightly raised in 
relation to the subject matter.  
One characteristic of Whitman’s book that mirrors some of the other Nazi law 
scholarship and may be related to this as well as the fact that in its overarching 
narratives it is more a book about US law than Nazi law, is the use of the concept of 
lawlessness without clear reasoning. For example, Whitman refers to 
“unambiguously criminal Nazi programs” (7). He also asserts the “great 
jurisprudential conflict at work in Nazi Germany … was between lawfulness, as 
founded in the civil-law idea of legal science, and lawlessness, in favour of which a 
man like Freisler could invoke the American common law” (152). This may be 
alluding to the conflict between the two aspects of Fraenkel’s dual state, but it is 
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different to Remnants of the Rechtsstaat. Meierhenrich is working with a model of 
Nazi law that explicitly incorporates both a lawful (normative state) and violent 
(prerogative state) way of governing, which could easily lead to the reductionist 
opposition of lawfulness and lawlessness. However, because Meierhenrich’s version 
of Nazi law is fully theorized and based on a socio-legal analysis, he is very careful 
in how he incorporates the extra-legal aspects found in the prerogative state into a 
wider model based on lawfulness. Even though Whitman also expressly contests 
some of the interpretations of Nazi law that reinforce the rupture thesis, he is a little 
less careful with his language in this particular respect because it is not the chief 
focus of his book.  
None of this, it should be emphasized, is to say that lawlessness and extra-legality 
was entirely absent from Nazi rule, but rather highlights the dangers of 
conceptualizing the Nazi state entirely as a lawless and criminal state and the 
importance of providing a strong theoretical and empirical justification for claims of 
lawlessness. The attribution of lawlessness to the Third Reich is very difficult thing to 
avoid when writing about the subject, a fact illustrated by use of this term and related 
language not just in some of the books discussed here, but in other recent legal 
histories of the Third Reich that in many ways advance our understanding of Nazi 
law significantly. It is, as implied by Whitman’s discussion, a natural instinct as well 
as something that can be supported in part by aspects of the Nazi state. This alone 
cannot be used to justify a denial of all complicity of law in the horrors of the Nazi 
state, a failure to draw comparisons and points of continuity with other legal regimes 
across time and space, and indeed a refusal to see Nazi “law” as anything more than 
the crass instrumentalization of the pre-existing legal framework. 
This latest round of books about Nazi law is innovative and welcome. It represents 
different disciplinary engagement, approaches and methodologies. It has empirical, 
theoretical, comparative and pedagogical faҫets, and so addresses Nazi law from a 
number of different perspectives, emphasizing different subject matter. This is 
important for constructing fruitful, interdisciplinary dialogue about Nazi law, which, 
these works clearly illustrate, is emerging but is still far from being achieved. It is not 
at all that everyone should speak about Nazi law with a single voice, but that ideally 
everyone would be aware of what is being said in other fields of scholarship, and so 
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be part of and contributing to a single, unified discourse, where they draw on each 
other’s insights into the broader subject. 
Where do the books discussed here situate the current—still somewhat atomized—
discourse in terms of our understanding of Nazi law? Towards the start, this article 
raised a number of issues: the legal academy’s neglect of the Holocaust in particular; 
the historical academy’s disregard for Nazi law as a distinct subject; and the 
prevalence of the rupture thesis in academic writing about Nazi law. Throughout, 
further issues emerged related to the rupture thesis, including the use of the 
language of lawlessness, criminality and instrumentalization in respect of the Third 
Reich, the focus on aspects of the legal regime that highlight terror and persecution 
while overlooking those that had a constitutive function for society, and the failure to 
explore the complicity of law in Nazi Germany.  
These works represent an important step forward in terms of historians writing about 
Nazi law and, to some extent, lawyers writing about the Holocaust (or at least its 
antecedent legal measures) and this builds on developments reflected in other 
recent published research. The rupture thesis is more multifaceted in its 
manifestations and difficult to overcome, but aspects of this are convincingly 
contested in this literature. The comparison of Nazi law with US race laws and the 
detailed re-application of the dual state model of Nazi law and its generalisation to 
the authoritarian rule of law exemplify this, but some of the contributions to Nazi Law 
and the creation of a specific casebook for a Law and the Holocaust course also 
make some ground in this direction. Some issues remain unresolved, however, or 
are more apparent in either historical or legal scholarship so much of this, we may 
suspect, can only be achieved by moving towards a more unified academic 
discourse of Nazi law. 
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